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Abstract 
The co-ordination of public services is an enduring challenge and an important policy priority. One 
way to achieve collaboration across organisational boundaries, which is being considered in public 
services such as the English NHS, is through the adoption of alliance contracting, prime provider 
contracting and outcome based contracting.  This paper reviews the cross-sectoral literature 
concerning the characteristics of these new contractual models, how they function, their impact, and 
their relation to public sector governance objectives. These new contractual forms are characterised 
 as models which, in line with the New Public Management/post New Public Management agenda, 
seek to incentivise providers through the transfer of risk from the commissioners to the providers of 
services.  Key findings are that the models are likely to incur high transaction costs relating to the 
negotiation and specification of outcomes and rely heavily on the relational aspects of contracting. 
There is also found to be a lack of convincing cross-sectoral evidence of the impact of the models, 
particularly in relation to improving co-ordination across organisations. The paper questions the 
reconciliation of the use of these new contractual models in settings such as the English NHS with the 
requirements of public sector governance for transparency and accountability. The models serve to 
highlight the problems inherent in the New Public Management/post New Public Management 
agenda of the transfer of risk away from commissioners of services in terms of transparency and 
accountability.  
Keywords 
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Introduction 
The co-ordination of public services is an enduring challenge (Webb, 1991).  The current drive to 
improve co-ordination in today’s public services can be understood as a response to the New Public 
Management (NPM) reforms of the 1990’s. In many cases, in those parts of the public sector which 
have adopted a NPM approach,  the provision of services is contracted by the state to diverse agencies 
(both state owned and independent), while the state specifies the output of services and allows the 
providers high levels of discretion about how these overarching aims are to be achieved (Hood, 1991, 
Klijn, 2012). The subsequent emerging post-NPM agenda seeks to achieve inter-organisational 
collaboration in a public service environment in which organisational diversity and independence has 
been encouraged, through the introduction of mechanisms to reduce the fragmentation of services 
(Bouckaert et al., 2010, Perri 6 et al., 2002), such as the facilitation of team building, and the 
development of a unified sense of values, trust and collaboration (Ling 2002).  
One group of mechanisms which may enable public sector co-ordination in post-NPM systems is new 
models of contracting, three of which, ‘alliance contracting’, ‘prime provider contracting‘ and 
‘outcome based contracting’, are the subject of this paper. These models appear to address both the 
NPM and post-NPM agenda. They satisfy the NPM agenda by offering contractual mechanisms which 
allow commissioners to specify the output of a service, reward providers for the attainment of goals 
rather than for effort, and encourage providers to devise ways to attain commissioner set goals. They 
address the requirements of the post-NPM agenda by using contractual mechanisms to incentivise 
providers to work together.  
The interest in these contractual models is particularly strong in relation to the delivery of health 
services in the English NHS. The co-ordination of health services is both complex and important. This 
complexity is due largely to the volume and range of organisations and professionals involved in 
 planning and providing services affecting the population’s health, including those across NHS acute, 
community and mental health services, but also in services outside the NHS, such as social services 
and the third sector.  This range has been increased by the policy drive from around 2002 onwards to 
further increase the diversity of organisations providing NHS services (Department of Health, 2002). 
The achievement of well co-ordinated services is clearly necessary as patient pathways for a single 
condition may necessitate treatment from a variety of settings.  Over the past few years English 
healthcare policy makers, commentators and interest groups have highlighted the potential of new 
contractual models to both improve the integration of services and allow better use of resources 
(Addicott, 2014, NHS England, 2014, NHS Commissioning Assembly, 2014, Corrigan and Hicks, 2001). 
Commissioners are not required to use these models to commission services, but their use is 
advocated. The most recent strategy document, Five Year Forward View, suggests that integrated 
working between separate organisations is developed, which should be facilitated through contractual 
mechanisms such as alliance, prime provider and/or outcome based contracts (NHS England, 2014), 
and NHS England has produced guidance regarding template alliance and prime contract agreements. 
The extent to which the models are being used in the NHS is not clear, however case study examples 
cited in policy reports (e.g. Addicott, 2014) indicate that they tend to be used in relation to complex 
services which span organisations, and focus on a specific population (e.g. older people) or care 
pathway (e.g. cancer).   
Whilst little is known about the operation of these models in the English NHS, they have been widely 
used in other settings. The literature concerning these models constitutes important evidence about 
how they function and their capacity to address the dual agenda of both incentivising providers to 
achieve commissioner-defined outputs and encouraging co-ordination between diverse providers. 
This paper presents a literature review of the international evidence concerning the characteristics of 
these new contractual models, the process of their implementation, and their impact. This evidence 
is drawn from health and welfare services internationally but also other sectors such as construction 
and defence, where such contracts have been used more extensively. Using contractual theory, the 
 paper considers the use of these contractual models in the English NHS, and the implications of the 
models for the governance of public services generally in light of the NPM and post-NPM regimes.  
Methods 
The literature search focused on three models: alliance contracting, prime provider contracting and 
outcome based contracting. Whilst, in practice, outcome based contracting is often used as a 
mechanism within the alliance and prime models, it can function as a standalone contractual model 
and it exists as a separate theoretical model with a separate empirical literature. The search strategies 
used in this literature review consisted of an initial background search to gain a feel for the literature, 
including the characteristics of the models and key theoretical concepts, followed by a database 
review, a Google scholar search and, finally, snowballing from references. The literature review took 
a purposive sampling strategy: literature was selected for inclusion based on relevance to the specific 
research question (learning about the contractual models which could be applied to the English NHS) 
rather than absolute criteria of methodological characteristics or rigour. This search method was 
considered apt given the scarcity of relevant empirical studies identified in the background search. 
The search was not restricted to specific dates. Four databases were selected to reflect a range of 
disciplines (Abi-inform, Web of Science, Academic Search Complete, Business Source Premier), and 
searched for a combination of keywords based on the terms ‘alliance based contracting’, ‘prime 
provider contracting’ and ‘outcome based contracting’. The inclusion criteria consisted of primary 
quantitative and qualitative research published studies, or reviews of primary quantitative and 
qualitative research published studies, and theoretical literature, written in the English language, for 
which the full text was available.  Alongside academic papers, the review included ‘grey’ literature 
such as reports detailing relevant policy initiatives and unpublished doctoral theses. 
 
Literature relating to ‘pay for performance’ in health care was not included. There are a number of 
existing reviews of pay for performance schemes in health care (e.g. Van Herck et al., 2010, Emmert 
 et al., 2012, Lagarde et al., 2013, Ogundeji et al., 2016). These payment systems share similarities with 
the outcome based model, but differ in their general emphasis on payment for specific provider 
behaviours and the attainment of performance targets rather than the achievement of overall service 
outputs across organisations. The range of schemes within pay for performance can differ widely from 
the outcome based contracting approach to include payments to individuals and teams in addition to 
payments made to organisations (for example paying individuals or teams on a ‘Fee for Service’ basis 
which reimburses providers for a specific service or activity). Due to the caution which should 
therefore be used when applying findings from pay for performance literature to the consideration of 
outcome based contracting, it was decided to exclude the literature from this review.  
 
Literature relating to Accountable Care Organisations (ACOs) was also excluded from this review. 
Whilst ACOs make use of prime and outcome based contracting approaches these are deployed within 
a significantly different environment in which, for example, providers form a single legal entity (Barnes 
et al., 2014). 
 
706 documents were identified through the database search. These were reduced to 26 based on 
relevance following a review of article title and abstract. Google search and snowballing from 
references identified 49 further relevant documents. 66 documents were included in the final review 
following the removal of duplicates. Five literature reviews relating to the use of the new contractual 
models in industry were identified (Selviaridis and Wynstra, 2015, Chen et al., 2012, Hypko et al., 2010, 
Bemelmans et al., 2012, Finn, 2011). Where the literature review presented findings which were 
relevant to this review these have been cited as the literature review itself, and individual papers have 
not been accessed. Appendix 1 details the empirical studies included in this literature review. 
The literature identified by this review suggests that alliance contracting, prime contracting and 
outcome based contracting are undertheorised areas. Much of the literature is normative in basis, and 
does not consider issues from a theoretical perspective, and does not give empirical evidence (Gallet 
 et al., 2015, O'Flynn et al., 2014, Chen et al., 2012, Buchanan and Klinger, 2007). A recent growing 
literature is concerned with identifying the applicability of these models to the NHS in the light of the 
current policy literature (e.g. Billings and Weger, 2015, Addicott, 2014). 
Overview of models 
Alliance contracting, prime provider contracting and outcome based contracting are conceptually 
distinct, but share the same basic rationale which is to transfer a proportion of the  risk associated 
with substandard performance from the commissioners to the providers of services and, in doing so, 
seek to incentivise providers to find innovative ways to achieve the aims of the commissioner. Where 
the commissioner’s aim relies on the inputs of multiple organisations, these organisations are 
incentivised to co-operate with each other. Alliance and prime contracting models achieve this by 
seeking to share (some or all) financial risk between a group of providers (and, in the case of alliancing, 
also commissioners). Outcome based contracts (which may be put into place in conjunction with 
alliance or prime contracting, or may, in principle, be used in a contract with a single provider) specify 
outcomes in addition to processes. A proportion of the payment to the provider will be dependent on 
achieving the specified outcomes.  
The key distinguishing features of each of the models are as follows, and are summarised in table 1 
below.    
TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE 
Alliance contracting, also known as ‘alliance partnering’, ‘pure alliance’ or ‘project alliance’,  is 
distinguishable from other partnership approaches due to the use of a single, legally enforceable, 
alliance contract between the commissioner of the service, and the organisation(s) delivering the 
project, to achieve unity of purpose between parties through the establishment of joint accountability 
(Chen et al., 2012). Approaches such as alliance contracting which aim to overcome the ‘adversarial 
nature’ of traditional contracting (Jefferies et al., 2014) have been prominent in the construction 
 industry since the 1990s. The contract includes a risk/reward shared incentive structure which states 
the division of financial rewards and penalties according to a fixed pre-agreed ratio between parties 
to reflect performance against targets. The performance of alliance partners is judged collectively, so 
partners, including the commissioner themselves, all win together or all lose together through a 
shared ‘collective ownership of risks’ (Rowlinson et al., 2006). The literature suggests that the ‘owner’ 
is a participant in the risk/reward structure. For example in a construction alliance contract, the owner 
would share the construction and design, sharing in cost overruns (Department of Infrastructure and 
Transport, 2011). The development of the relationship between alliance partners is an important part 
of alliance contracting, with an emphasis on co-production and relationship-building between the 
commissioner and the alliance partners. In place of using the written contract to resolve disputes, 
alliance partners are expected to resolve issues without recourse to the courts for dispute resolution, 
and contracts may include a no blame/no dispute clause, which excludes recourse to litigation 
(Rowlinson et al., 2006, Gransberg and Scheepbouwer, 2015, Chew, 2004, Chew, 2007), and 
unanimous decision making protocols (Davies, 2008). 
In prime contracting the commissioner contracts with a provider for the delivery of a contract which 
is likely to span a number of providers. The prime contracting agent subcontracts with other providers 
to deliver the contract. Contracts are intended to have a ‘black box’ approach to allow providers 
flexibility and freedom in the achievement of outcomes (Finn, 2011). The model is based on the belief 
that commissioners should move away from micro managing complex supply chains, and that moving 
this responsibility to a lead provider will result in better integrated services (Corrigan and Laitner, 
2012, Matthews and Parker, 1999, O'Flynn et al., 2014). There is evidence of the use of prime 
contracting in defence (Matthews and Parker, 1999, Pryke, 2006, Kebede, 2011, Ndekugri and Corbett, 
2004), the construction industry (Bemelmans et al., 2012, Voordijk et al., 2000, Burtonshaw-Gunn and 
Ritchie, 2004, Rojas, 2008), and contracts for the provision of welfare services (Finn, 2011, Finn, 2012, 
Hudson et al., 2010, Gallet et al., 2015). In common with alliance contracting, albeit to a lesser degree, 
prime contracting emphasises the development of trusting and co-operative relationships between 
 contractual partners, both between the client and the prime contractor team (Defence Estates and 
Ministry of Defence, 2003, Kebede, 2011), and within the supply chain (Finn, 2012, p5). 
Outcome based contracting is a contractual form which emphasises the achievement of outcomes 
rather than specifying the processes by which outcomes are to be achieved (Caldwell and Howard, 
2014). Additionally outcome based contracting can be differentiated from other forms of contracting 
due to: the focus on the alignment of goals and incentives across supply chains; increased risk and 
rewards for suppliers as performance achievement is related to financial bonuses and penalties; an 
emphasis on the co-production of outcomes through customer/supplier interactions (Selviaridis and 
Wynstra, 2015). Outcome based contracting is often used in conjunction with other contractual 
models, such as alliance contracting and prime contracting models, but is also a standalone 
contractual models in its own right. Outcome based contracting may have varying degrees of relative 
importance within the contract dependent on the proportion of the overall payment which is 
dedicated to performance in relation to outcomes. Outcome based contracting is a common approach 
for ‘business to government’ contracts such as defence and infrastructure maintenance (Ng et al., 
2009, Selviaridis and Wynstra, 2015), but is also a growing approach in ‘business to business’ 
contracting (Ng et al., 2009).  
Contracting in public services and contractual theory 
This section summarises the main elements of contractual theory which are used to review the 
evidence concerning these new models of contracting. Contractual theory, drawn from economic, 
socio economic and socio legal fields aids the exploration of issues encountered in contractual 
relationships. Contracts are not simply a technical device which allow all aspects of performance to be 
specified and monitored, but are instruments which require analysis.  
A fundamental characteristic of these new contractual models is the creation of incentives for service 
providers based on the allocation of risk. A contract is put in place when one party (a principal) desires 
an outcome but the activities to achieve this must be undertaken by another party (an agent). All 
 contracts carry the risk that the agent will act in their own interests rather than those of the principal. 
Whilst many contracts monitor agent performance against the contract to ensure the agent is acting 
in the principal’s interests these new contractual models also use incentives to encourage the agent 
to achieve the outcome desired by the principal, as the principal rewards or punishes the agent for 
their performance in relation to the outcome the principal wishes to achieve. By focusing on the 
outcome, it is hoped that opportunistic agent behaviour such as withholding or distorting information 
(gaming), shirking, failing to fulfil promises and appropriation of others’ assets (Parkhe, 1993), will be 
lessened.   
Certain characteristics of the product, the organisations involved and the market itself can make the 
use of incentives to achieve the alignment of principal/agent objectives problematic, and increase 
transaction costs. Transaction costs refer to the cost of making exchanges, and consist of the costs of 
firstly, negotiating, specifying and drafting a contract (ex ante costs) and then secondly, monitoring 
and enforcing compliance with that contract (ex post costs) (Coase, 1937, Williamson, 1985).This is 
particularly so in the case of public services such as the NHS where objectives are multiple, may differ 
(or conflict) across stakeholders, and may therefore be hard to identify and measure. Furthermore the 
way to achieve objectives might not be certain as the link between action and outcomes is not clear, 
or because the achievement of outcomes may be out of the direct control of agents. The danger is 
that outcome measures will not be effective or that outcomes which are hard to measure will not be 
incentivised (Goddard et al., 2000).  Indeed, the complexity of attributing and measuring outcomes in 
relation to public services has given rise to concerns regarding the possibility and practicality of using 
outcome based payment in relation to public services (Lagarde et al., 2013, Perrins, 2008). 
Some of the aforementioned difficulties with contracting have been observed to be mitigated in 
practice. Whilst the contract document endeavours to deal with future arrangements, it is impossible 
to forsee all possible contingencies and eventualities. Thus, contracts cannot be ‘complete’ 
(Williamson, 1985) or entirely ‘discrete’ (MacNeil, 1978, Vincent-Jones, 2006), and the contract is, to 
a degree, a balance between discrete and relational norms. In the relational element of the contract, 
 parties rely on ‘relational’ norms such as trust, flexibility, solidarity and reciprocity to sustain the 
contractual relationship. Trust in particular is acknowledged to be important to partnership working, 
as a mechanism which enables the management of risk (Luhmann, 1979, Sako, 1998, Nooteboom, 
2002). These contractual models, particularly alliance contracting and prime provider contracting, rely 
heavily on the relational aspects of the contractual relationship. 
These concepts form the framework through which the applicability of these models to the NHS will 
be explored. The analysis consists of three sections. Firstly, an analysis of the evidence relating to the 
process of establishing the contractual arrangements. Secondly, what is known about the impact of 
these arrangements, particularly in light of the aims articulated by policy makers. Thirdly, an 
examination of the fit of these models with the requirements of public sector governance issues.  
Analysis of the literature 
Negotiation and specification of new contractual forms 
The evidence relating to the negotiation and specification of alliance, prime provider and outcome 
based contracts suggests firstly, that the process of negotiation and specification is likely to be costly 
and secondly, that there is likely to be a substantial reliance on relational norms between contractual 
parties. 
 
The negotiation and specification of outcomes involves significant effort on the part of both the 
principal and agents where an outcome based structure is used. The establishment of outcome based 
measurement has been found to  necessitate the development of new information systems, requiring 
investment in bespoke data collection and analysis, development of measurement methodologies and 
monitoring systems (Selviaridis and Wynstra, 2015). It may also demand a more rigorous contract 
specification thereby highlighting pre-existing issues concerning contract quality, requiring remedial 
action such as an analysis of the services and outputs which are required from contractors (Hannah et 
al., 2010, Arthur and Kennedy, 2014, Laurent, 1998). It should be noted that, whilst theory would 
 suggest that these systems incur ‘high’ transaction costs, it is not possible, given the weakness of the 
evidence in this regard, to empirically assess whether these transaction costs are higher than those 
for other contractual forms. Nevertheless, these likely requirements indicate that that considerable 
transaction costs will be incurred in the ex ante period where outcome based contracting is used. 
However, in mitigation it should also be noted that these transaction costs may be recouped by cost 
savings created during the life of the contract (Langfield-Smith, 2008). In the case of prime contracting 
the transaction costs of negotiating and managing sub-contracts can be greatly reduced for the 
commissioner by moving this role to the prime contractor (Finn, 2011). 
 
Whilst contractual theory suggests that the identification and agreement of outcomes is difficult to 
achieve in relation to public services, much of the literature does not address directly the issue of 
finding and agreeing the right outcome measures directly. However the literature does suggest that 
the negotiation and specification of outcomes should be seen as an ongoing and iterative process, 
beyond the contract specification (Arthur and Kennedy, 2014, Hannah et al., 2010, Gelderman et al., 
2015). The effective deployment of incentives depends upon the accurate setting of thresholds. 
Theory suggests the full or partial transfer of risk is a significant motivator of behaviour, and the 
evidence suggests that risk transfer is significant when pure outcome based contracts are deployed 
(Martin, 2007). However, suppliers may well be reluctant to agree to contracts fully linking payment 
to performance due to the risk of non-payment, and risk premium payments and rewards linked to 
milestones may be needed to overcome this (Selviaridis and Wynstra, 2015).  Difficulties specifying 
outcomes, particularly in relation to public services, may further weaken the incentive structure. One 
example of outcome based contracting in relation to public sector services suggests that outcomes 
were informally respecified during the contractual period when providers were unable to meeting 
them (Hudson et al., 2010). 
The limits of the written contract to pin down and agree outcome based performance ‘up front’, 
suggests that these models may instead rely on relational norms to steer the contract, and to manage 
 risks which cannot be controlled in the written contract. The reliance on relational norms is explicit in 
the alliance contracting model, which is seen as ‘a relationship based contractual arrangement’ (Love 
et al., 2010). Many of the success factors identified in the alliance literature are relational in nature  
such as developing a leadership enriched culture, establishing top management support, and 
dedicating adequate resources to this end (Love et al., 2010, Davies, 2008). It is normal practice in the 
formation of alliance contracts for the alliance partners to participate in a ‘pre-alliance’ period after 
the partners are selected and before the contract commences. During this period the terms of the 
written elements of the contract are agreed but also partners work together to establish an ‘alliance 
perspective’ by undertaking activities which enhance goodwill trust (Langfield-Smith, 2008). An 
important element in this regard is the acceptance that many issues will be resolved during the 
performance of the contract, rather than as part of the written contract.  
 
Although it is expected that prime provider contracting also relies on relational norms due to the 
ongoing specification of performance this is not recognised to any great degree in the literature. This 
is particularly interesting as relationships between prime contractors and subcontractors can become 
strained if risk and cost pressure is passed down the supply chain (Matthews and Parker, 1999, Gallet 
et al., 2015, Finn, 2011).Distrust may occur between prime and sub-contractors due to the perception 
that prime contractors are profiting from the contracts at the expense of sub-contractors (Gallet et 
al., 2015, Maddock, 2013, Matthews and Parker, 1999, Finn, 2011).  
The literature relating to prime contracting and outcome based contracting suggests that both are 
susceptible to opportunism. A possible negative effect of incentive payments for outcomes is the 
encouragement of gaming (Frumkin, 2001, Jacob and Levitt, 2003). Evidence suggests that outcome 
based contracting, including models which combine prime and outcome contracting, can lead to 
gaming activities such as ‘cherry picking’ of easier clients  (Hudson et al., 2010), data recording 
irregularities (i.e. over/under reporting)  (Lu and Ching-to Albert, 2006, Caldwell and Howard, 2014), 
poor quality service (Hannah et al., 2010) and the skimping of service provision (ibid). In relation to 
 prime contracting, there are concerns that the scope for opportunistic behaviour is exacerbated by 
the ‘hands off’ approach adopted by the commissioner. However, the literature did not include any 
empirical observations relating to this concern. It is also noted that incentivisation and regulation can 
be tailored to mitigate for gaming, such as for example requiring providers to accept all referrals in 
order to prevent cherry picking (Finn, 2011). 
The aspects of alliance contracting which set it apart from other types of partnership working (i.e. the 
emphasis on risk sharing) may reduce the scope for opportunistic behaviour, and there is some 
evidence that this is successful (Laan et al., 2011). Whilst there may be less opportunistic behaviour 
within the alliance contracting relationship, concerns have been raised, in the light of project 
underruns against the target outturn cost, that there is a temptation at the start of the contractual 
process for agents to overestimate the costs involved (Love et al., 2010). 
 
The impact of new contractual models 
The literature is surprisingly light on evidence relating to the benefits of these new contractual 
approaches, and a number of studies conclude that it is difficult to draw any conclusions in this regard 
due to difficulties with attribution and measurement (Caldwell and Howard, 2014, Buchanan and 
Klinger, 2007, Henneveld, 2006, Bresnen and Marshall, 2000, Love et al., 2010). This may reflect the 
complexity of these contractual models and of the environment in which they are deployed, which 
leads to difficulties in directly attributing changes in performance to these models. Some of the 
improvements achieved such as the financial benefits of improved risk management are difficult to 
quantify (Matthews and Parker, 1999), and the impact of the contractual model may not be 
immediately discernible (Finn, 2011). 
A prominent benefit which is anticipated in relation to the use of these new contractual models is 
increased integration of services. Interestingly, the literature does not directly address the issue of 
whether integration is increased. Chen et al. (2012) found evidence that alliance contracting led to 
 various benefits such as a reduction in capital costs, the development of innovations, improved 
relationships between contractual partners and improvement in non-cost outcomes (such as 
enhanced reputations and improvement of competitive advantage), all of which may be related to 
improved integration, but are not synonymous with it. The prime provider literature includes a small 
number of studies that suggest sharing of good practice occurs amongst supply chain members (Lane 
et al., 2013) and that there is better co-ordination of services as a result of the prime provider 
approach (Muir et al., 2010), however equally this literature refers to tension and mistrust between 
prime and sub contractors. On balance, given that improved integration is a key perceived benefit for 
both alliance contracting and prime provider contracting, there is a lack of empirical evidence to 
support this. Indeed Caldwell and Howard (2014), in their review of procuring for outcomes in the UK 
defence sector using alliance arrangements, specifically warn against the implication that contracting 
for performance does away with intra- and inter organisational silos, such as budgetary silos and lack 
of inter service information sharing.  
The evidence base for other advantages of the new contractual models is also under-developed and 
lacking in rigour. There is some evidence that prime contracting can reduce costs (Ndekugri and 
Corbett, 2004). Evidence from UK Ministry of Defence pilot prime contractor construction projects 
suggests benefits of over 70% increase in labour productivity, a 25% reduction in construction time, 
reduced materials wastage and a reduction in through life costs (Holti et al., 2000). The UK Department 
of Work and Pensions prime provider programme was also found to deliver cost savings(Lane et al., 
2013), however there was also evidence that the incentive design in the contract led to under-serving 
of hardest to place groups, especially those on disability benefits (Lane et al., 2013).The alliance 
contracting literature reports that many construction projects were completed within the target costs 
and timescales using alliance contracting principles (Gransberg and Scheepbouwer, 2015). However, 
there is some scepticism regarding reported cost savings in particular in the alliance contracting 
literature from the construction sector due to the practice of alliance partners (over) estimating their 
capital expenditure requirements (Love et al., 2010, Chen et al., 2012). Furthermore any benefits may 
 be due to the implementation of good practice project delivery methods and the identification of good 
quality contractors rather than any elements inherent in the contractual models themselves (Bresnen 
and Marshall, 2000, Buchanan and Klinger, 2007, Davies, 2008).  
 
A further benefit cited for these new contractual models is that they lead to improvements in the 
quality of services, and again the evidence base in this regard is not convincing. The evidence 
concerning instances of opportunism and gaming suggests that the quality of services may not be 
consistent. One route to improving service quality anticipated for these models was the development 
of innovative approaches by providers. Evidence suggests that there may be limited incentives for 
innovation (Langfield-Smith, 2008), and other priorities such as efficiency savings may take priority 
(Hudson et al., 2010).   
Risk and governance  
A third distinguishable theme emerging from the literature, in addition to the implementation and 
impact of these new contractual models, concerns public sector governance. The transfer of risk and 
accountability from commissioner to provider inherent to varying degrees in these models is held to 
be in tension with public sector governance objectives including accountability, integrity and 
transparency (Davies, 2008, O'Flynn et al., 2014, Gallet et al., 2015). The notion that risk can ever fully 
be transferred from principal to agent in any context is itself subject to debate, as responsibility for 
the contract reverts to the principal should the agent fail mid programme (Caldwell and Howard, 
2014). This leads to concerns about a mismatch of risk and accountability, where those parties 
(assumed to be) carrying the risk are not ultimately accountable for failure.  This concern is, of course, 
particularly accentuated in relation to  public services where principals have a statutory responsibility 
for the provision of services to the population, and therefore retain ultimate accountability for service 
failures (Doerr et al., 2005). One possible response where commissioners retain accountability may 
 be that operational risk transfer may be jeopardised (Selviaridis and Wynstra, 2015), and indeed there 
is limited evidence that this has occurred in the public sector in practice (Hudson et al., 2010). 
 
There are a number of specific issues relating to public sector governance identified in the literature. 
The literature identifies issues of accountability caused by the ‘distance’ of the commissioner from the 
provision of services, particularly in relation to prime provider and outcome based contracting, which 
is a necessary by-product of the transfer of full or partial responsibility for performance from 
commissioner to provider. The literature articulates a number of related concerns. Firstly, it is feared 
that prime contractor models can degrade the expertise of the commissioner, leading to information 
asymmetry between the commissioner and the prime providers, exacerbated by the transfer of assets, 
knowledge and skills, thereby weakening its ability to identify shortcomings in the prime contractor’s 
performance, and to regain ownership and control of the contract should the prime contractor fail 
(Kebede, 2011, Finn, 2011). There is a risk that the commissioner becomes over reliant on a limited 
number of organisations who can act as prime providers, resulting in a ‘hostage’ situation (O'Flynn et 
al., 2014, Kebede, 2011). Concerns are also raised regarding the selection of subcontractors, where 
there is perceived to be a need for the principal to retain an oversight of and control over the 
subcontractors who are selected for reasons of security (Matthews and Parker, 1999) or to maintain 
a diverse delivery network (Finn, 2012). 
 
Alliance contracting represents a sharing of risk between all alliance partners, including the 
commissioner (Arthur and Kennedy, 2014) and which is also problematic when considering 
accountability. Under a traditional contract, specific responsibility and risk is allocated to individual 
parties, together with the legal consequences for individual failure (Langfield-Smith, 2008). The 
alliance contract, however, suggests a collective ownership of the alliance project among partners, 
and a jointly shared risk, creating potential uncertainty about where accountability lies in the event of 
under or poor performance of a single alliance partner (Davies, 2008). The nature of public services 
 suggests that the individual organisations within the alliance should be held to account for their poor 
performance, and it appears inappropriate, given the scarcity of financial resources, that an 
organisation should be unduly penalised for another’s poor performance. The ‘no-dispute’ clause 
commonly included in alliance contracts appears to remove an important contractual mechanism 
which would in other contracts be used to signal when one party in a contract had serious concerns 
for instance relating to clinical performance.  
 
Issues of integrity and transparency are also flagged in the literature in relation to the selection of 
both alliance partners and subcontractors in the prime provider model. The procurement of public 
services should adhere to principles of transparency to ensure appropriate use of resources and value 
for money. These principles are in potential tension with the common approach of the selection of 
alliance partners without price competition, and on the basis of criteria such as previous working 
relationships (Love et al., 2010). Further potential issues are related to the transfer of responsibility 
for the identification of providers from the commissioner in the prime provider model. It is suggested 
that prime contractors (when they are private sector organisations) may not be subject to the same 
procurement rules as public sector commissioners (Finn, 2011). Although the lack of competitive 
procurement processes is not forbidden in the selection of some service providers, reasonable 
assurances are required regarding the processes followed to satisfy regulatory bodies that the most 
suitable provider has been chosen. Indeed a complaint of this nature has been made in relation to the 
commissioning of NHS contracts previously (Monitor, 2015). Whilst the complaint was not upheld, it 
was clear that the commissioner was required to undergo a rigorous due diligence process to ensure 
that the selected provider would provide value for money (Sanderson et al., 2016).  
 
These public sector governance risks do not have an evidential grounding in the literature, and indeed 
may be mitigated by safeguards. In the prime model, commissioners’ distance may be mitigated if 
commissioners retain a stewardship role, through for example performance managers or co-located 
 Integrated Project Teams, or through the imposition of contractual safeguards which allow 
commissioner intervention in the case of poor performance (Kebede, 2011, Defence Estates and 
Ministry of Defence, 2003, Finn, 2011, Finn, 2012). Problems of transparency encountered in alliance 
contracts may be addressed by the introduction of price competition, and issues concerning shared 
risks may be mitigated by allocating specific risks to specific alliance partners (Davies, 2008).  
 
Discussion 
This literature review explored the cross–sectoral evidence regarding alliance, prime and outcome 
based contracting in order to identify learning which could be applied to the use of these models in 
the English NHS concerning how the models function, their impact, and their relation to public sector 
governance objectives. An underlying agenda was to assess the suitability of the models to address 
the NPM and post-NPM agenda to both allow incentivisation and co-ordination of diverse providers 
of public services. 
The literature was drawn from diverse sectors, including construction, defence, and service industries, 
and whilst there is much that is transferable to health services, there are likely to be areas of 
divergence in the operation of these models in health and non-health settings. These areas are 
discussed here as, firstly, differences relating to health as a product and, secondly, the wider 
institutional environment in the English NHS. 
In relation to health services, a number of aspects of the new contractual models may be more 
problematic in health than in other sectors. Issues relating to the identification and agreement of 
outcome measures are not directly addressed by the cross-sectoral literature, but theory suggests this 
may be problematic to achieve in health where objectives may be multiple, may differ across 
stakeholders and therefore be hard to identify and measure. Opportunism may also assume greater 
significance in relation to health services. Unsurprisingly the evidence concerning opportunism came 
largely from studies of public service contracts e.g. (Hudson et al., 2010, Hannah et al., 2010), 
 reflecting concerns regarding in the potential impact of opportunism on the public sector priorities of 
equality of provision and equality of outcomes. Additionally, the cross-sectoral literature did not 
present convincing evidence concerning the potential of these models to achieve integration, an issue 
which is of central importance to the health sector.  
 
Secondly, it is helpful to draw out differences relating to the wider environment in which NHS health 
services are delivered. It is clear that transaction costs, particularly those relating to alliance contracts, 
are front loaded. It appears likely that where these initiatives are introduced in cash poor public sector 
services such as health, the up front investment required of local commissioners and providers will 
act as a disincentive to the introduction of these models, or alternatively will lead to the introduction 
of potentially damaging short cuts in the process of contract negotiation and specification. Analysis of 
the failed ‘UnitingCare’ NHS contract in Cambridgeshire suggests that at least part of the failure was 
due to significant issues not resolved during the negotiation due to time pressures and confusion 
about which party was to bear the significant start up costs (National Audit Office, 2016). As the 
literature indicates, these models are particularly popular in sectors where risk is transferred from the 
public to private purse, such as the relatively widespread use of alliance contracting in the Australian 
construction industry (Rowlinson et al., 2006). The transfer of risk may become a less desirable project 
in relation to services such as the English NHS where despite an increasing diversity of providers, 
provision is still largely delivered by public sector organisations. 
What emerges strongly from the literature that is transferable to the health sector, is that these 
models do not offer ‘simple’ solutions to the issue of achieving the co-ordination of diverse providers 
of public services. These contractual models encounter many of the relational issues which are 
acknowledged to be fundamental to existing contractual relationships in the provision of public 
services (Craig, 1994, Allen et al., 2014), and therefore do not in or of themselves provide a ‘magic 
bullet’ solution to issues which are faced in public service contracting. What may be an advantage of 
 these models however, particularly alliance contracting, above traditional contractual forms, is that 
the need to invest in the establishment of trusting relationships between parties is clearly 
acknowledged as fundamental to the success of the contract. 
The consideration of these models in the light of public services has led to questions about their 
compatibility with the requirements of public service governance. These questions stem largely from 
the varying degrees of the transfer of risk from commissioner to provider which is inherent to these 
models, and concern whether it is feasible or advisable to transfer accountability for public services 
away from the bodies which are ultimately responsible for that service. The issues raised in this respect 
are not specific to the contractual models under discussion, but more generally, address issues 
inherent in the NPM and post-NPM agendas which seek to improve the provision of public services by 
giving more responsibility and freedom to diverse providers. Indeed, concerns about issues of 
accountability in relation to partnerships in  post-NPM public sector are not new (e.g. (Christensen 
and Laegreid, 2012). The evidence relating to these new contractual models highlights these enduring 
issues, and questions the feasibility of reconciling the NPM and post-NPM projects of diverse 
innovative provision and the co-ordination in public service provision, with the need to ensure that 
public services are accountable and transparent.  
 
 
 
Conclusion 
Whilst there is strong interest in the potential of these new contractual models to achieve innovative 
partnership working across the diverse providers of public sector services, the evidence relating to 
their operation in diverse sectors to date suggests that their introduction to settings such as the NHS 
should proceed cautiously. Importantly, there is as yet no convincing cross-sectoral evidence of the 
impact of the models.  Whilst the models may bring benefits, they also have costs which must be 
 considered, such as of agreeing and monitoring outcomes, and of investing in the establishment and 
sustenance of good relations between contractual partners.  These issues notwithstanding there 
remain important questions about the reconciliation of the use of these new contractual models in 
the commissioning and provision of public services such as those in the English NHS and the 
requirements of public sector governance for transparency and accountability. The models can be 
viewed as enacting the NPM/post NPM agenda of the transfer of risk away from commissioners to 
providers of services, and the potential problems this brings in terms of transparency and 
accountability.  
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 TABLE 1: Key characteristics of contractual models 
Model Defining characteristics Sectors from which literature 
drawn 
Alliance 
contracting 
 Single alliance contract between the 
commissioner of the service and the 
organisations delivering the project 
 Risk/reward incentive structure shared 
across alliance partners giving collective 
ownership of risks (win together/lose 
together model) 
 Recruitment of alliance partners without 
competitive tender process 
 Emphasis on coproduction, facilitated by 
governance structures and relationship 
building activities to encourage collective 
responsibility 
 Contract may include no dispute clause 
 
 Construction, public services, 
aerospace 
Prime Provider 
contracting 
 Commissioner contracts with a single 
(prime) provider for the delivery of a 
service likely to span a number of 
organisations 
 Prime contractor has responsibility for 
managing the supply chain, including the 
commissioning sub contractors 
 Prime contractor may also provide some 
services 
 Prime contractor often paid on an 
outcome based model  
 
 Defence, construction, public 
services, health 
 
Outcome based 
contracting 
 Contract pays on the achievement of 
outcomes (or proxy measure) 
 Commonly use risk/reward structure to 
reward parties in accordance with their 
efforts 
 May be used in conjunction with other 
contractual models such as alliance 
contracting and prime contracting 
 Defence, construction, ICT, 
welfare services, health 
services 
 
 Appendix 1 - Empirical papers included in the review 
 
Author Year Title Model Sector Study type 
Arthur, R. & Kennedy, J. 2014 Procurement and delivery of required 
performance: care study 
Outcome based Defence/construction Qualitative 
Bresnen, M. & Marshall, N. 2000 Building partnerships: case studies of client-
contractor collaboration in the UK construction 
industry 
Outcome based Construction  Qualitative 
Buchanan, N. & Klinger, D. 2007 Performance-based contracting: Are we 
following the mandate? 
Outcome based Defence/maintenance Qualitative 
Burtonshaw-Gunn, S.A. & 
Ritchie, R.L. 
2004 Developments in construction supply chain 
management and prime contracting 
Prime Construction Qualitative 
Caldwell, N. & Howard, M. 2014 Contracting for complex performance in 
markets of few buyers and sellers. The case of 
military procurement 
Outcome based Defence Qualitative 
Chew, A. 2007 Governments and project financiers may 
achieve better value for money in adopting 
alliancing as a form of delivery structure in 
delivering PPP projects in Australia 
Alliance Construction Qualitative 
Clifton, C. & Duffield, C. 2006 Improved PFI/PPP service outcomes through 
the integration of Alliance principles 
Alliance Construction Quantitative 
Davies, J.P. 2008 Alliance contracts and public sector governance Alliance Public sector Qualitative 
Gates, L. et al 2005 Outcomes-based funding for vocational services 
and employment of people with mental health 
conditions 
Outcome based Employment services Mixed methods 
Gelderman, C.J. et al 2015 Dynamics of service delivery: an explorative 
case study of the purchasing process of 
professional ICT services 
Outcome based ICT services Qualitative 
Gransberg, D.D. & 
Scheepbouwer, E. 
2015 Alliance contracting: evolving alternative 
project delivery 
Alliance Construction Qualitative 
 Guo, L. & Ng, I. 2011 The co-production of equipment-based 
services: An interpersonal approach 
Outcome based Defence Qualitative 
Hannah, G. et al 2010 Developing performance-based contracts 
between agencies and service providers: results 
from a Getting to Outcomes support system 
with social service agencies 
Outcome based Social Services Mixed methods 
Hauck, A.J. et al 2004 Project alliancing at National Museum of 
Australia : the collaborative 
process 
Alliance Construction Qualitative 
Hosseinian, S.M. & 
Carmichael, D.G. 
2013 Optimal gainshare/painshare in alliance 
projects 
Alliance Construction Quantitative 
Jacob, B.A. & Levitt, S.D. 2003 Rotten apples: an investigation into the 
prevalence and predictors of teacher cheating 
Outcome based Education Quantitative 
Jefferies, M. et al 2014 Using a case study approach to identify critical 
success factors for alliance contracting 
Alliance Construction Qualitative 
Jefferies, M. et al 2006 Relationship management in the Australian 
construction industry: a catalyst for cultural 
change 
Alliance Construction Qualitative 
Kebede, E. 2011 The application of transaction cost economics 
to UK defence acquisition 
Prime Defence Qualitative 
Koolwijk, J.S.J. 2006 Alternative dispute resolution methods used in 
alliance contracts 
Alliance Construction Qualitative 
Laan, A. et al 2011 Reducing opportunistic behaviour through a 
project alliance 
Alliance Construction Qualitative 
Lane, P. et al 2013 Work programme evaluation: procurement, 
supply chains and implementation of the 
commissioning model 
Outcome 
based/prime 
Employment services Mixed methods 
Langfield-Smith, K. 2008 The relations between transactional 
characteristics, trust and risk in the start-up 
phase of a collaborative alliance 
Alliance Construction Qualitative 
Love, P.E.D. et al 2010 Price competitive alliance projects: 
identification of success factors for public 
clients 
Alliance Construction Qualitative 
 Lu, M. & Ching-To Albert, M. 2006 Financial incentives and gaming in alcohol 
treatment 
Outcome based Health Quantitative 
Maddock, S. 2013 The DWP work programme – the impact of the 
DWP procurement model on personal service 
innovation 
Outcome 
based/Prime 
Employment services Qualitative 
Mayer, K.J. & Treece, T.J. 2008 Unpacking strategic alliances: The structure and 
purpose of alliance versus supplier relationships 
Alliance Aerospace Qualitative 
Muir, K. et al 2010 The national evaluation of the Communities for 
Children initiative 
Prime Child services Mixed methods 
Ng, I.C.L. et al 2009 Outcome-based contracts as a driver for 
systems thinking and service-dominant logic in 
service science 
Outcome based Defence Qualitative 
Ng, I.C.L. et al 2013 Outcome-based contracts as new business 
model: The role of partnership and value-driven 
relational assets 
Outcome based Cross sector 
(equipment services) 
Mixed methods 
Pryke, S.D. 2006 Legal issues associated with emergent actor 
roles in innovative UK procurement: prime 
contracting case study 
Prime Construction Qualitative 
Randall, W.S. et al 2010 Evolving a theory of performance-based 
logistics using insights from service dominant 
logic 
Outcome based Cross sector Qualitative 
Rojas, E.M. 2008 Single versus multiple prime contracting Prime Construction  Quantitative 
Rowlinson, S. et al 2006 Alliancing in Australia. No litigation contracts: a 
tautology? 
Alliance Construction Qualitative 
Selviaridis, K. & Normann, A. 2014 Performance-based contracting in service 
supply chains: a service provider risk 
perspective 
Outcome based Cross sector Qualitative 
Straub, A. 2010 Maintenance contractors acting as service 
innovators 
Outcome based Construction Qualitative 
Voordijk, H. et al 2000 Changing governance of supply chains in the 
building industry: a multiple case study 
Prime Construction  Qualitative 
 
